return c.g.apply(ctx).CreateInBatches(r, batchSize).Error
}

type chainG[T any] struct {
	execG[T]
}

func (c chainG[T]) getInstance() *DB {
	var r T
	return c.g.apply(context.Background()).Model(r).getInstance()
}

func (c chainG[T]) with(v op) chainG[T] {
	return chainG[T]{
		execG: execG[T]{g: &g[T]{
			db:  c.g.db,
			ops: append(append([]op(nil), c.g.ops...), v),

        TestAuthenticationChain chain2 = new TestAuthenticationChain();
        TestAuthenticationChain chain3 = new TestAuthenticationChain();

        chain1.loadResult = user1;
        chain2.loadResult = user2;
        chain3.loadResult = user3;

        authenticationManager.addChain(chain1);
        authenticationManager.addChain(chain2);

    val interceptor1 =
      Interceptor { chainA: Interceptor.Chain ->
        assertThat(chainA.connectTimeoutMillis()).isEqualTo(5000)
        val chainB = chainA.withConnectTimeout(100, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS)
        assertThat(chainB.connectTimeoutMillis()).isEqualTo(100)
        chainB.proceed(chainA.request())
      }
    val interceptor2 =
      Interceptor { chain: Interceptor.Chain ->

        User u = user;
        for (final AuthenticationChain chain : chains) {
            u = chain.load(u);
        }
        return u;
    }

    /**
     * Adds an authentication chain to the manager.
     * @param chain The authentication chain to add.
     */
    public void addChain(final AuthenticationChain chain) {
        chains = ArrayUtils.addAll(chains, chain);
    }

    /**

     *     chain.proceed(chain.request())
     * }
     * ```
     */
    inline operator fun invoke(crossinline block: (chain: Chain) -> Response): Interceptor = Interceptor { block(it) }
  }

  interface Chain {
    fun request(): Request

    @Throws(IOException::class)
    fun proceed(request: Request): Response

    /**

      }
    }
  }

  /**
   * Not checking the CA bit created a vulnerability in old OkHttp releases. It is exploited by
   * triggering different chains to be discovered by the TLS engine and our chain cleaner. In this
   * attack there's several different chains.
   *
   *
   * The victim's gets a non-CA certificate signed by a CA, and pins the CA root and/or
   * intermediate. This is business as usual.
   *

   * already been determined.
   */
  public abstract <T extends @Nullable Object> ComparisonChain compare(
      @ParametricNullness T left, @ParametricNullness T right, Comparator<T> comparator);

  /**
   * Compares two {@code int} values as specified by {@link Integer#compare}, <i>if</i> the result
   * of this comparison chain has not already been determined.
   */

        FilterChain chain = createDefaultFilterChain();
        for (final Filter element : filterList) {
            chain = appendFilterChain(element, chain);
        }
        filterChain = chain;
    }

    /**
     * Appends a filter to an existing filter chain.
     *
     * @param filter the filter to append
     * @param chain the existing filter chain to append to

        this.mid = mid;
    }

    /**
     * Chains another message to this message for compound operations.
     *
     * @param n the message to chain
     * @return whether chaining was successful
     */
    public boolean chain(final ServerMessageBlock2 n) {
        if (this.next != null) {
            return this.next.chain(n);
        }

        n.addFlags(SMB2_FLAGS_RELATED_OPERATIONS);

            if (arg instanceof Smb2CreateRequest) {
                Smb2CreateRequest create = (Smb2CreateRequest) arg;
                // Initialize response chain (also for chained query)
                Smb2CreateResponse cr = create.initResponse(cifsContext);

                // Access chained Smb2QueryDirectoryRequest via reflection
                Smb2QueryDirectoryRequest q = (Smb2QueryDirectoryRequest) getNextOf(create);