{
  "name": "istio build-tools",
  "image": "gcr.io/istio-testing/build-tools:master-c67afcee625a4b91bdde7da65c9867f98248691e",
  "privileged": true,
  "remoteEnv": {
    "USE_GKE_GCLOUD_AUTH_PLUGIN": "True",
    "BUILD_WITH_CONTAINER": "0",
    "CARGO_HOME": "/home/.cargo",
    "RUSTUP_HOME": "/home/.rustup"
  },
  "features": {
    "ghcr.io/devcontainers/features/docker-outside-of-docker:1": {},
    "ghcr.io/mpriscella/features/kind:1": {}
  },

	// within all pods as we do on the host.
	//
	// This should be fine, as the host binaries are all we have to work with here anyway,
	// as we are running within a privileged container - and we don't want to take the time to
	// redetect for each pod anyway.
	//
	// Extreme corner case:
	// If for some reason your host had both binaries, and you were injecting out-of-band

	BINV	X30, X5, X6				// 3393e269
	BINV	$63, X6					// 1313f36b
	BINVI	$1, X7, X8				// 13941368
	BSET	X8, X9, X10				// 33958428
	BSET	$63, X9					// 9394f42b
	BSETI	$1, X10, X11				// 93151528

	//
	// Privileged ISA
	//

	// 3.3.1: Environment Call and Breakpoint
	ECALL						// 73000000
	SCALL						// 73000000
	EBREAK						// 73001000
	SBREAK						// 73001000

- Added a new `--init-only` command line flag to `kube-proxy`. Setting the flag makes `kube-proxy` perform its initial configuration that requires privileged mode, and then exit. The `--init-only` mode is intended to be executed in a privileged init container, so that the main container may run with a stricter `securityContext`. ([#120864](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/120864), [@uablrek](https://github.com/uablrek)) [SIG Network...

		Patch(
			context.Background(),
			pod.Name,
			types.MergePatchType,
			annotationPatch,
			metav1.PatchOptions{},
			// Both "pods" and "pods/status" can mutate the metadata. However, pods/status is lower privilege, so we use that instead.
			"status",
		)
	return err
}

func AnnotateUnenrollPod(client kubernetes.Interface, pod *metav1.ObjectMeta) error {

	Remove(ctx context.Context, object string, rv remoteVersionID) error
	InUse(ctx context.Context) (bool, error)
}

const probeObject = "probeobject"

// checkWarmBackend checks if tier config credentials have sufficient privileges
// to perform all operations defined in the WarmBackend interface.
func checkWarmBackend(ctx context.Context, w WarmBackend) error {
	remoteVersionID, err := w.Put(ctx, probeObject, strings.NewReader("MinIO"), 5)

            InterpolateObjectAction action =
                    new InterpolateObjectAction(obj, valueSources, postProcessors, debugEnabled, this, getLogger());

            ModelInterpolationException error = AccessController.doPrivileged(action);

            if (error != null) {
                throw error;
            }
        } finally {
            getInterpolator().clearAnswers();
        }
    }

from anywhere, and executes the graphs it is sent without performing any checks.
Therefore, if you run a `tf.train.Server` in your network, anybody with access
to the network can execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user
running the `tf.train.Server`.

## Untrusted inputs during training and prediction

TensorFlow supports a wide range of input data formats. For example it can

      try {
        return Unsafe.getUnsafe();
      } catch (SecurityException tryReflectionInstead) {
        // We'll try reflection instead.
      }
      try {
        return AccessController.doPrivileged(
            (PrivilegedExceptionAction<Unsafe>)
                () -> {
                  Class<Unsafe> k = Unsafe.class;
                  for (Field f : k.getDeclaredFields()) {

This client could be a browser with a frontend, a code from someone else, an IoT device, etc.

You could need to tell the client that:

* The client doesn't have enough privileges for that operation.
* The client doesn't have access to that resource.
* The item the client was trying to access doesn't exist.
* etc.