}

  public void testWithoutParameters() {
    assertSame(MediaType.parse("image/gif"), MediaType.parse("image/gif").withoutParameters());
    assertEquals(
        MediaType.parse("image/gif"), MediaType.parse("image/gif; foo=bar").withoutParameters());
  }

  public void testWithParameters() {
    assertEquals(
        MediaType.parse("text/plain; a=1; a=2; b=3"),

Using the below example document:
<img width="85%" src="https://bradley.codes/static/img/jstream-levels.gif" alt="jstream"/>

we can choose to extract and act only the objects within the top-level array:
```go
f, _ := os.Open("input.json")
decoder := jstream.NewDecoder(f, 1) // extract JSON values at a depth level of 1

have different security properties and provide different levels of confidence
when dealing with untrusted data. Based on the security history of these
libraries we consider that it is safe to work with untrusted inputs for PNG,
BMP, GIF, WAV, RAW, RAW\_PADDED, CSV and PROTO formats. All other input formats,
including tensorflow-io should be sandboxed if used to process untrusted data.

For example, if an attacker were to upload a malicious video file, they could

	// Some standard object extensions which we strictly dis-allow for compression.
	standardExcludeCompressExtensions = []string{".gz", ".bz2", ".rar", ".zip", ".7z", ".xz", ".mp4", ".mkv", ".mov", ".jpg", ".png", ".gif"}

	// Some standard content-types which we strictly dis-allow for compression.

   * >Debian 3.48-1</a>.
   *
   * @since 15.0
   */
  public static final MediaType CRW = createConstant(IMAGE_TYPE, "x-canon-crw");

  public static final MediaType GIF = createConstant(IMAGE_TYPE, "gif");
  public static final MediaType ICO = createConstant(IMAGE_TYPE, "vnd.microsoft.icon");
  public static final MediaType JPEG = createConstant(IMAGE_TYPE, "jpeg");

path.encoding=UTF-8
use.own.tmp.dir=true
max.log.output.length=4000
adaptive.load.control=50
supported.uploaded.js.extentions=js
supported.uploaded.css.extentions=css
supported.uploaded.media.extentions=jpg,jpeg,gif,png,swf
supported.uploaded.files=license.properties

    "TENSORFLOW_API_INIT_FILES_V1",
)
load("//tensorflow/python/tools/api/generator2:generate_api.bzl", "generate_apis")
# copybara:comment_end

PACKAGE_STATIC_DEPS = [
    "//:__subpackages__",
    "@gif//:__subpackages__",
    "@highwayhash//:__subpackages__",
    "@hwloc//:__subpackages__",
    "@icu//:__subpackages__",
    "@libjpeg_turbo//:__subpackages__",
    "@llvm-project//:__subpackages__",

    /** The key of the configuration. e.g. css */
    String SUPPORTED_UPLOADED_CSS_EXTENTIONS = "supported.uploaded.css.extentions";

    /** The key of the configuration. e.g. jpg,jpeg,gif,png,swf */
    String SUPPORTED_UPLOADED_MEDIA_EXTENTIONS = "supported.uploaded.media.extentions";

    /** The key of the configuration. e.g. license.properties */

flict=function(){return o.default.fn.modal=ut,Ct._jQueryInterface};var St=["background","cite","href","itemtype","longdesc","poster","src","xlink:href"],Nt=/^(?:(?:https?|mailto|ftp|tel|file|sms):|[^#&/:?]*(?:[#/?]|$))/i,Dt=/^data:(?:image\/(?:bmp|gif|jpeg|jpg|png|tiff|webp)|video\/(?:mpeg|mp4|ogg|webm)|audio\/(?:mp3|oga|ogg|opus));base64,[\d+/a-z]+=*$/i;function At(t,e,n){if(0===t.length)return t;if(n&&"function"==typeof n)return n(t);for(var i=(new window.DOMParser).parseFromString(t,"text/htm...

*   Fixes a heap out-of-buffer read vulnerability in the QuantizeAndDequantize operation [CVE-2023-25668](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-25668)
*   Fixes a segfault when opening multiframe gif [CVE-2023-25667](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-25667)
*   Fixes an NPE in SparseSparseMaximum [CVE-2023-25665](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-25665)