Previously, site replication required the root credentials of peer sites to be identical. This is no longer necessary because STS tokens are now signed with the site replicator service account credentials, thus allowing flexibility in the independent management of root accounts across sites and the ability to disable root accounts eventually.

- `account` client_id is a confidential client that belongs to the realm `{realm}`
- `account` client_id is has **Service Accounts Enabled** option enabled.
- `account` client_id has a custom "Audience" mapper, in the Mappers section.
  - Included Client Audience: security-admin-console

#### Adding 'admin' Role

### Lookup-Bind

A low-privilege read-only LDAP service account is configured in the MinIO server by providing the account's Distinguished Name (DN) and password. This service account is used to perform directory lookups as needed.

```
MINIO_IDENTITY_LDAP_LOOKUP_BIND_DN*          (string)    DN for LDAP read-only service account used to perform DN and group lookups

		// For STS policy map, we need to merge the new cache with the existing
		// cache because the periodic IAM reload is partial. The periodic load
		// here is to account for STS policy mapping changes that should apply
		// for service accounts derived from such STS accounts (i.e. LDAP STS
		// accounts).
		newCache.iamSTSPolicyMap.Range(func(k string, v MappedPolicy) bool {
			cache.iamSTSPolicyMap.Store(k, v)
			return true
		})

MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_DISPLAY_NAME          (string)    Friendly display name for this Provider/App
MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_CONFIG_URL*           (url)       openid discovery document e.g. "https://accounts.google.com/.well-known/openid-configuration"
MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_CLIENT_ID*            (string)    unique public identifier for apps e.g. "292085223830.apps.googleusercontent.com"

```
mc admin config set myminio/ identity_openid

KEY:
identity_openid  enable OpenID SSO support

ARGS:
config_url*   (url)       openid discovery document e.g. "https://accounts.google.com/.well-known/openid-configuration"
client_id     (string)    unique public identifier for apps e.g. "292085223830.apps.googleusercontent.com"
claim_name    (string)    JWT canned policy claim name, defaults to "policy"

		return
	}

	// Permission checks:
	//
	// 1. Any type of account (i.e. access keys (previously/still called service
	// accounts), STS accounts, internal IDP accounts, etc) with the
	// policy.UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction permission can update any service
	// account.
	//
	// 2. We would like to let a user update their own access keys, however it

	// account or STS account):
	requestorUser := cred.AccessKey
	requestorParentUser := cred.AccessKey
	requestorGroups := cred.Groups
	requestorIsDerivedCredential := false
	if cred.IsServiceAccount() || cred.IsTemp() {
		requestorParentUser = cred.ParentUser
		requestorIsDerivedCredential = true
	}

	// Check if we are creating svc account for request sender.

	c.assertSvcAccS3Access(ctx, s, cr, bucket)

	// 3. Check that svc account can restrict the policy, and that the
	// session policy can be updated.
	c.assertSvcAccSessionPolicyUpdate(ctx, s, s.adm, accessKey, bucket)

	// 4. Check that service account's secret key and account status can be
	// updated.
	c.assertSvcAccSecretKeyAndStatusUpdate(ctx, s, s.adm, accessKey, bucket)

		if s3Err != ErrNone {
			return nil, nil, false, errAuthentication
		}

		maps.Copy(claims.MapClaims, eclaims)

		// if root access is disabled, disable all its service accounts and temporary credentials.
		if ucred.ParentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !globalAPIConfig.permitRootAccess() {
			return nil, nil, false, errAccessKeyDisabled
		}

		// Now check if we have a sessionPolicy.