if objectSize > maxMultipartPutObjectSize {
		err = errors.New("entity too large")
		return partSize, err
	}

	configuredPartSize := minPartSize
	// Use floats for part size for all calculations to avoid
	// overflows during float64 to int64 conversions.
	partSizeFlt := float64(objectSize / maxPartsCount)
	partSizeFlt = math.Ceil(partSizeFlt/float64(configuredPartSize)) * float64(configuredPartSize)

	// Part size.

	if err != nil {
		return Info{}, err
	}
	//nolint:unconvert
	devID := uint64(st.Dev) // Needed to support multiple GOARCHs
	info.Major = unix.Major(devID)
	info.Minor = unix.Minor(devID)

	// Check for overflows.
	// https://github.com/minio/minio/issues/8035
	// XFS can show wrong values at times error out
	// in such scenarios.
	if info.Free > info.Total {

    private static final Object[] OBJECT_ARGS = new Object[0];

    /**
     * Use a WeakHashMap here, so the keys (Class objects) can be garbage collected.
     * This approach prevents permgen space overflows due to retention of discarded
     * classloaders.
     */
    private static final Map<Class<?>, WeakReference<ClassMap>> CLASS_MAPS = new WeakHashMap<>();

    static final int EOF = -1;

}

func (st *HTTPStats) addRequestsInQueue(i int32) {
	atomic.AddInt32(&st.s3RequestsInQueue, i)
}

func (st *HTTPStats) incS3RequestsIncoming() {
	// Golang automatically resets to zero if this overflows
	atomic.AddUint64(&st.s3RequestsIncoming, 1)
}

// Converts http stats into struct to be sent back to the client.
func (st *HTTPStats) toServerHTTPStats(toLowerKeys bool) ServerHTTPStats {

//
// It panics if count is negative or if the result of (len(b) * count)
// overflows.
func Repeat(b []byte, count int) []byte {
	if count == 0 {
		return []byte{}
	}

	// Since we cannot return an error on overflow,
	// we should panic if the repeat will generate an overflow.
	// See golang.org/issue/16237.
	if count < 0 {
		panic("bytes: negative Repeat count")
	}

*   Fixes an overflow producing a crash in `tf.range`
    ([CVE-2021-41202](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-41202))
*   Fixes an overflow producing a crash in `tf.image.resize` when size is large
    ([CVE-2021-41199](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-41199))
*   Fixes an overflow producing a crash in `tf.tile` when tiling tensor is large

func (p *Parser) positiveAtoi(str string) int64 {
	value, err := strconv.ParseInt(str, 0, 64)
	if err != nil {
		p.errorf("%s", err)
	}
	if value < 0 {
		p.errorf("%s overflows int64", str)
	}
	return value
}

func (p *Parser) atoi(str string) uint64 {
	value, err := strconv.ParseUint(str, 0, 64)
	if err != nil {
		p.errorf("%s", err)
	}
	return value
}

		t.Errorf("Archive has unexpected number of files, got %d, want 5", len(r.File))
	}
}

func TestCVE202139293(t *testing.T) {
	// directory size is so large, that the check in Reader.init
	// overflows when subtracting from the archive size, causing
	// the pre-allocation check to be bypassed.
	data := []byte{
		0x50, 0x4b, 0x06, 0x06, 0x05, 0x06, 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x50, 0x4b,

discard high bits upon overflow, and programs may rely on "wrap around".
</p>

<p>
For signed integers, the operations <code>+</code>,
<code>-</code>, <code>*</code>, <code>/</code>, and <code>&lt;&lt;</code> may legally
overflow and the resulting value exists and is deterministically defined
by the signed integer representation, the operation, and its operands.

	switch fieldValue.(type) {
	case int, int8, int16, int32, int64:
		result = time.Unix(rv.Int(), 0).UTC()
	case uint, uint8, uint16, uint32, uint64:
		if uv := rv.Uint(); uv > math.MaxInt64 {
			err = fmt.Errorf("integer overflow conversion uint64(%d) -> int64", uv)
		} else {
			result = time.Unix(int64(uv), 0).UTC() //nolint:gosec
		}
	case *int, *int8, *int16, *int32, *int64:
		if rv.IsZero() {
			return nil, nil
		}