HeldCertificate.Builder()
        .serialNumber(3L)
        .certificateAuthority(0)
        .commonName("compromised intermediate")
        .signedBy(pinnedRoot)
        .build()
    val attackerIntermediate =
      HeldCertificate.Builder()
        .keyPair(attackerCa.keyPair) // Share keys between compromised CA and intermediate!
        .serialNumber(4L)

       "$hash = (Get-FileHash \"%WRAPPER_JAR%\" -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLower();"^
       "If('%WRAPPER_SHA_256_SUM%' -ne $hash){"^
       "  Write-Error 'Error: Failed to validate Maven wrapper SHA-256, your Maven wrapper might be compromised.';"^
       "  Write-Error 'Investigate or delete %WRAPPER_JAR% to attempt a clean download.';"^
       "  Write-Error 'If you updated your Maven version, you need to update the specified wrapperSha256Sum property.';"^

     * Most TLS clients that connect to hosts on the public Internet should call this method.
     * Otherwise it is necessary to manually prepare a comprehensive set of trusted roots.
     *
     * If the host platform is compromised or misconfigured this may contain untrustworthy root
     * certificates. Applications that connect to a known set of servers may be able to mitigate
     * this problem with [certificate pinning][CertificatePinner].
     */

    exit 1
  fi
  if [ $wrapperSha256Result = false ]; then
    echo "Error: Failed to validate Maven wrapper SHA-256, your Maven wrapper might be compromised." >&2
    echo "Investigate or delete $wrapperJarPath to attempt a clean download." >&2
    echo "If you updated your Maven version, you need to update the specified wrapperSha256Sum property." >&2
    exit 1
  fi
fi

Critically, the CA must enforce that the ztunnel has permission to request that identity.
Requests for identities not running on the node are rejected.
This is critical to ensure that a compromised node does not compromise the entire mesh.

This CA enforcement is done by Istio's CA, and is a requirement for any alternative CAs integrating with Ztunnel.

	errKMSDefaultKeyAlreadyConfigured = errors.New("A default encryption already exists on KMS")
	// Additional MinIO errors for SSE-C requests.
	errObjectTampered = errors.New("The requested object was modified and may be compromised")
	// error returned when invalid encryption parameters are specified
	errInvalidEncryptionParameters     = errors.New("The encryption parameters are not applicable to this object")

* **Automatische validatie** zelfs voor *padoperatie* parameters gedefinieerd in dependencies.
* Ondersteuning voor complexe gebruikersauthenticatiesystemen, **databaseverbindingen**, enz.
* **Geen compromisen** met databases, gebruikersinterfaces, enz. Maar eenvoudige integratie met ze allemaal.

### Ongelimiteerde "plug-ins"

Of anders gezegd, je hebt ze niet nodig, importeer en gebruik de code die je nodig hebt.

Many packages that simplify it a lot have to make many compromises with the data model, database, and available features. And some of these packages that simplify things too much actually have security flaws underneath.

---

**FastAPI** doesn't make any compromise with any database, data model or tool.

It gives you all the flexibility to choose the ones that fit your project the best.

    * UUID.
    * ...et autres.

Toutes les validations sont gérées par le bien établi et robuste **Pydantic**.

### Sécurité et authentification

La sécurité et l'authentification sont intégrées. Sans aucun compromis avec les bases de données ou les modèles de données.

Tous les protocoles de sécurités sont définis dans OpenAPI, incluant:

* HTTP Basic.

       * crashes on Android when running in 32-bit mode. For maximum safety, we shouldn't use
       * Unsafe.getLong() at all, but the performance benefit on x86_64 is too great to ignore, so
       * as a compromise, we enable the optimization only on platforms that we specifically know to
       * work.
       *
       * In the future, the use of Unsafe.getLong() should be replaced by ByteBuffer.getLong(),