| (inBytes[inOff + i * 4 + 2] & 0xff) << 8 | inBytes[inOff + i * 4 + 3] & 0xff;
        }
    }

    /// Spread ints into bytes.
    /**
     * Converts integers to bytes after internal DES processing
     * @param inInts the input integer array
     * @param inOff the offset into the input array

                });
            }

            // Start all threads
            for (Thread t : threads) {
                t.start();
            }

            // Wait for completion
            for (Thread t : threads) {
                t.join();
            }

            // Verify thread safety - no unexpected exceptions

 *       the expected <i>twofold</i> increase to all collision rates. Informally, the "information"
 *       in the hash code should be as evenly "spread out" through the hash code's bits as possible.
 *       The result is that, for example, when choosing a bucket in a hash table of size 2^8,
 *       <i>any</i> eight bits could be consistently used.

 *       the expected <i>twofold</i> increase to all collision rates. Informally, the "information"
 *       in the hash code should be as evenly "spread out" through the hash code's bits as possible.
 *       The result is that, for example, when choosing a bucket in a hash table of size 2^8,
 *       <i>any</i> eight bits could be consistently used.

     * look at table entries if it is 0.
     *
     * - All (synchronized) write operations should write to the "count" field after structurally
     * changing any bin. The operations must not take any action that could even momentarily
     * cause a concurrent read operation to see inconsistent data. This is made easier by the

     * at table entries if it is 0.
     *
     * - All (synchronized) write operations should write to the "count" field after structurally
     * changing any bin. The operations must not take any action that could even momentarily cause a
     * concurrent read operation to see inconsistent data. This is made easier by the nature of the

    - [Container Images](#container-images-3)
  - [Changelog since v1.33.0](#changelog-since-v1330)
  - [Urgent Upgrade Notes](#urgent-upgrade-notes)
    - [(No, really, you MUST read this before you upgrade)](#no-really-you-must-read-this-before-you-upgrade)
  - [Changes by Kind](#changes-by-kind-3)
    - [Deprecation](#deprecation)
    - [API Change](#api-change)
    - [Feature](#feature-2)
    - [Failing Test](#failing-test)

    - [Container Images](#container-images-15)
  - [Changelog since v1.32.0-alpha.3](#changelog-since-v1320-alpha3)
  - [Urgent Upgrade Notes](#urgent-upgrade-notes-1)
    - [(No, really, you MUST read this before you upgrade)](#no-really-you-must-read-this-before-you-upgrade)
  - [Changes by Kind](#changes-by-kind-14)
    - [Deprecation](#deprecation-1)
    - [API Change](#api-change-5)
    - [Feature](#feature-10)

- Pod spread constraints have been added in alpha. You can use these constraints to control how Pods are spread across the cluster among failure-domains. ([#77327](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/77327), [#77760](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/77760), [#77828](https://github.com/...

### CVE-2022-3162: Unauthorized read of Custom Resources

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users authorized to list or watch one type of namespaced custom resource cluster-wide can read custom resources of a different type in the same API group they are not authorized to read.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kube-apiserver v1.25.0 - v1.25.3