if err != nil {
			return nil, errAuthentication
		}
	} else {
		// Temporary credentials are not allowed.
		if ui.Credentials.IsTemp() {
			return nil, errAuthentication
		}
		if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(ui.Credentials.SecretKey), pass) != 1 {
			return nil, errAuthentication
		}
	}

	copts := map[string]string{
		"AccessKey": ui.Credentials.AccessKey,
		"SecretKey": ui.Credentials.SecretKey,

			return len(ldapPolicies) > 0, nil
		}
		return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(sa.Credentials.SecretKey), []byte(password)) == 1, nil
	}

	ui, ok := globalIAMSys.GetUser(context.Background(), username)
	if !ok {
		return false, nil
	}
	return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(ui.Credentials.SecretKey), []byte(password)) == 1, nil
}

func (cred Credentials) Equal(ccred Credentials) bool {
	if !ccred.IsValid() {
		return false
	}
	return (cred.AccessKey == ccred.AccessKey && subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(cred.SecretKey), []byte(ccred.SecretKey)) == 1 &&
		subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(cred.SessionToken), []byte(ccred.SessionToken)) == 1)
}

var timeSentinel = time.Unix(0, 0).UTC()

// ErrInvalidDuration invalid token expiry

		tokenErr := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInvalidRequest)
		tokenErr.Description = "The request route included in the request is invalid"
		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, tokenErr, r.URL)
		return
	}

	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(resp.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzRequestToken)), []byte(eventData.GetObjectContext.OutputToken)) != 1 {
		tokenErr := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInvalidToken)

	// based on admin credential such that token cannot be decoded
	// on the client side and is treated like an opaque value.
	claims, err := auth.ExtractClaims(token, secret)
	if err != nil {
		if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(secret), []byte(globalActiveCred.SecretKey)) == 1 {
			return nil, errAuthentication
		}
		claims, err = auth.ExtractClaims(token, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
		if err != nil {

	if err != nil {
		return false
	}
	signature2, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(sig2)
	if err != nil {
		return false
	}
	return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(signature1, signature2) == 1
}

// Return canonical headers.
func canonicalizedAmzHeadersV2(headers http.Header) string {
	var keys []string
	keyval := make(map[string]string, len(headers))

			if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(oldKey, newKey) == 1 {
				return errInvalidSSEParameters // AWS returns special error for equal but invalid keys.
			}
			return crypto.ErrInvalidCustomerKey // To provide strict AWS S3 compatibility we return: access denied.
		}

		if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(oldKey, newKey) == 1 && sealedKey.Algorithm == crypto.SealAlgorithm {

			return
		}
		writeSuccessResponseJSON(w, resp)
		return
	}

	// 3. Compare generated key with decrypted key
	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(key.Plaintext, decryptedKey) != 1 {
		response.DecryptionErr = "The generated and the decrypted data key do not match"
		resp, err := json.Marshal(response)
		if err != nil {

== t, and zero otherwise. func (e *{{ .Element }}) Equal(t *{{ .Element }}) int { eBytes := e.Bytes() tBytes := t.Bytes() return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(eBytes, tBytes) } // IsZero returns 1 if e == 0, and zero otherwise. func (e *{{ .Element }}) IsZero() int { zero := make([]byte, {{ .Prefix }}ElementLen) eBytes := e.Bytes() return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(eBytes, zero) } // Set sets e = t, and returns e. func (e *{{ .Element }}) Set(t *{{ .Element }}) *{{ .Element }} { e.x = t.x return e }...

== t, and zero otherwise. func (e *{{ .Element }}) Equal(t *{{ .Element }}) int { eBytes := e.Bytes() tBytes := t.Bytes() return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(eBytes, tBytes) } // IsZero returns 1 if e == 0, and zero otherwise. func (e *{{ .Element }}) IsZero() int { zero := make([]byte, {{ .Prefix }}ElementLen) eBytes := e.Bytes() return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(eBytes, zero) } // Set sets e = t, and returns e. func (e *{{ .Element }}) Set(t *{{ .Element }}) *{{ .Element }} { e.x = t.x return e }...