users are aware of the security risks detailed here and that they are going to
be practically running code provided by other users. Currently there are no good
ways to detect malicious models/graphs/checkpoints, so the recommended way to
mitigate the risk in this scenario is to sandbox the model execution.

### Hardware attacks

//
// This is intended to be used when a peer failure is detected.
TF_CAPI_EXPORT extern void TFE_AbortCollectiveOps(TFE_Context* ctx,
                                                  TF_Status* status);

// Checks the health of collective ops peers. Explicit health check is needed in
// multi worker collective ops to detect failures in the cluster.  If a peer is
// down, collective ops may hang.

# limitations under the License.
# ==============================================================================

setup_file() {
    bazel version  # Start the bazel server

    # Fixes "fatal: detected dubious ownership in repository" for Docker.
    git config --system --add safe.directory '*'
    git config --system protocol.file.allow always

    # Note that you could generate a list of all the affected targets with e.g.:

      TF_GUARDED_BY(mu);

  // The keys of this map are all the active sessions using this graph. Each
  // value records whether the graph has been mutated since the corresponding
  // session has been run (this is detected in RecordMutation function). If the
  // string is empty, no mutation has occurred. Otherwise the string is a
  // description of the mutation suitable for returning to the user.
  //

  // with the corresponding name prefix or if there is exactly one matching
  // object and it is the directory marker. Therefore we need to retrieve
  // at most two children for the prefix to detect if a directory is empty.
  auto gcs_file = static_cast<GCSFile*>(filesystem->plugin_filesystem);
  auto childrens = GetChildrenBounded(gcs_file, path, 2, true, true, status);
  if (TF_GetCode(status) != TF_OK) return;

        TF_NewWhile(func_graph_, &inputs[0], inputs.size(), s_)));
    ASSERT_EQ(TF_OK, TF_GetCode(s_)) << TF_Message(s_);
    params->name = "test_loop";

    // Initialize outputs so we can easily detect errors/bugs
    outputs.resize(2, {nullptr, -1});

    // Create loop: while (input1 < input2) input1 += input2 + 1
    TF_Operation* less_than = LessThan(

# Flag to enable remote config
common --experimental_repo_remote_exec

# Make Bazel not try to probe the host system for a C++ toolchain.
build:rbe_base --config=resultstore
build:rbe_base --repo_env=BAZEL_DO_NOT_DETECT_CPP_TOOLCHAIN=1
build:rbe_base --define=EXECUTOR=remote
build:rbe_base --jobs=800
build:rbe_base --remote_executor=grpcs://remotebuildexecution.googleapis.com
build:rbe_base --remote_timeout=3600

        ":tf_tstring",
        "//tensorflow/core:protos_all_cc",
        "//tensorflow/core/platform:tstring",
        "@com_google_absl//absl/status",
        "@local_xla//xla/tsl/c:tsl_status",
    ] + select({
        "//tensorflow:with_xla_support": [
            "//tensorflow/compiler/jit",
            "//tensorflow/compiler/tf2xla:xla_compiler",
        ],
        "//conditions:default": [],
    }) + if_tensorrt([

# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# ==============================================================================
#
# Re-direct all links in $1 that are relative to be canonical

BASE="$1"
find "${BASE}" -type l | \
  while read l ; do
    if [[ "$(readlink "$l")" == \.\./* ]]; then
      CANONICAL="$(readlink "$l")";
      rm "$l";

    *   Fix FTRL L2-shrinkage behavior: the gradient from the L2 shrinkage term
        should not end up in the accumulator.
    *   Fix toco compilation/execution on Windows.
    *   GoogleZoneProvider class added to detect which Google Cloud Engine zone
        tensorflow is running in.
    *   It is now safe to call any of the C API's TF_Delete\* functions on
        nullptr.
    *   Log some errors on Android to logcat.