}
	return cfg
}

// LDAP keys and envs.
const (
	ServerAddr         = "server_addr"
	SRVRecordName      = "srv_record_name"
	LookupBindDN       = "lookup_bind_dn"
	LookupBindPassword = "lookup_bind_password"
	UserDNSearchBaseDN = "user_dn_search_base_dn"
	UserDNSearchFilter = "user_dn_search_filter"
	GroupSearchFilter  = "group_search_filter"
	GroupSearchBaseDN  = "group_search_base_dn"

		default:
			bts, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
			if err != nil {
				err = msgp.WrapError(err)
				return
			}
		}
	}
	o = bts
	return
}

// Msgsize returns an upper bound estimate of the number of bytes occupied by the serialized message
func (z BucketBandwidthReport) Msgsize() (s int) {
	s = 1
	return
}

// DecodeMsg implements msgp.Decodable

		default:
			bts, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
			if err != nil {
				err = msgp.WrapError(err)
				return
			}
		}
	}
	o = bts
	return
}

// Msgsize returns an upper bound estimate of the number of bytes occupied by the serialized message
func (z BaseOptions) Msgsize() (s int) {
	s = 1
	return
}

// DecodeMsg implements msgp.Decodable

	tx = db.getInstance()
	var whereConds []interface{}

	for _, cond := range conds {
		if c, ok := cond.(clause.Interface); ok {
			tx.Statement.AddClause(c)
		} else if optimizer, ok := cond.(StatementModifier); ok {
			optimizer.ModifyStatement(tx.Statement)
		} else {
			whereConds = append(whereConds, cond)
		}
	}

	if len(whereConds) > 0 {

	Algorithm string   // The sealing algorithm used to encrypt the object key.
}

// Seal encrypts the ObjectKey using the 256 bit external key and IV. The sealed
// key is also cryptographically bound to the object's path (bucket/object) and the
// domain (SSE-C or SSE-S3).
func (key ObjectKey) Seal(extKey []byte, iv [32]byte, domain, bucket, object string) SealedKey {
	if len(extKey) != 32 {

			if err != nil {
				err = msgp.WrapError(err, zb0001, zb0003)
				return
			}
		}
		(*z)[zb0001] = zb0002
	}
	o = bts
	return
}

// Msgsize returns an upper bound estimate of the number of bytes occupied by the serialized message
func (z localLockMap) Msgsize() (s int) {
	s = msgp.MapHeaderSize
	if z != nil {
		for zb0006, zb0007 := range z {
			_ = zb0007

				if err != nil {
					err = msgp.WrapError(err, zb0001)
					return
				}
			}
		}
		(*z)[zb0001] = zb0002
	}
	o = bts
	return
}

// Msgsize returns an upper bound estimate of the number of bytes occupied by the serialized message
func (z DailyAllTierStats) Msgsize() (s int) {
	s = msgp.MapHeaderSize
	if z != nil {
		for zb0007, zb0008 := range z {
			_ = zb0008

				if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, errNoSuchServiceAccount) {
					return nil, err
				}
				if errors.Is(err, errNoSuchServiceAccount) {
					targetUser, targetGroups, err := globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.Bind(c.User(), string(pass))
					if err != nil {
						return nil, err
					}
					ldapPolicies, _ := globalIAMSys.PolicyDBGet(targetUser, targetGroups...)
					if len(ldapPolicies) == 0 {

	// connChange will be signaled whenever State has been updated, or at regular intervals.
	// Holding the lock allows safe reads of State, and guarantees that changes will be detected.
	connChange *sync.Cond
	handlers   *handlers

	remote             *RemoteClient
	auth               AuthFn
	clientPingInterval time.Duration
	connPingInterval   time.Duration
	tlsConfig          *tls.Config

	// redetect for each pod anyway.
	//
	// Extreme corner case:
	// If for some reason your host had both binaries, and you were injecting out-of-band
	// iptables rules within a pod context into `legacy` tables, but your host context preferred
	// `nft`, we would still inject our rules in-pod into nft tables, which is a bit wonky.
	//