}

		// Finally, if there is no parent policy, check if a policy claim is
		// present in the session token.
		if len(policies) == 0 {
			// If there is no parent policy mapping, we fall back to
			// using policy claim from JWT.
			policySet, ok := args.GetPolicies(iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID())
			if !ok {
				// When claims are set, it should have a policy claim field.
				return false
			}

// the i-th server in this will be applied the i-th policy in `rolePolicies`. If
// a rolePolicies entry is an empty string, that server will be configured as
// policy-claim based openid server. NOTE that a valid configuration can have a
// policy claim based provider only if it is the only OpenID provider.
func (s *TestSuiteIAM) SetUpOpenIDs(c *check, testApps []OpenIDClientAppParams, rolePolicies []string) error {

	// secret key, temporary credentials become invalid if
	// server admin credentials change. This is done to ensure
	// that clients cannot decode the token using the temp
	// secret keys and generate an entirely new claim by essentially
	// hijacking the policies. We need to make sure that this is
	// based on admin credential such that token cannot be decoded
	// on the client side and is treated like an opaque value.

		vStr, ok := v.(string)
		if ok {
			// Trim any LDAP specific prefix
			args[strings.ToLower(strings.TrimPrefix(k, "ldap"))] = []string{vStr}
		}
	}

	// Add groups claim which could be a list. This will ensure that the claim
	// `jwt:groups` works.
	if grpsVal, ok := claims["groups"]; ok {
		if grpsIs, ok := grpsVal.([]interface{}); ok {
			grps := []string{}
			for _, gI := range grpsIs {

		return fmt.Errorf("STS credential could not be verified: %w", err)
	}

	mapClaims := claims.Map()
	expiry, err := auth.ExpToInt64(mapClaims["exp"])
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("Expiry claim was not found: %v: %w", mapClaims, err)
	}

	cred := auth.Credentials{
		AccessKey:    stsCred.AccessKey,
		SecretKey:    stsCred.SecretKey,
		Expiration:   time.Unix(expiry, 0).UTC(),

// or service credentials, mapped to all distinct roleARNs associated with the
// parent user. The dummy role ARN is associated with parent users from
// policy-claim based OpenID providers.
func (store *IAMStoreSys) GetAllParentUsers() map[string]ParentUserInfo {
	cache := store.rlock()
	defer store.runlock()

	res := map[string]ParentUserInfo{}

	// JWT claim keys
	expClaim = "exp"
	subClaim = "sub"
	audClaim = "aud"
	issClaim = "iss"

	// JWT claim to check the parent user
	parentClaim = "parent"

	// LDAP claim keys
	ldapUser  = "ldapUser"     // this is a key name for a DN value
	ldapUserN = "ldapUsername" // this is a key name for the short/login username

	// Role Claim key
	roleArnClaim = "roleArn"
)

		if !ok {
			return nil, nil, false, errInvalidAccessKeyID
		}
		ucred := u.Credentials
		// get embedded claims
		eclaims, s3Err := checkClaimsFromToken(req, ucred)
		if s3Err != ErrNone {
			return nil, nil, false, errAuthentication
		}

		for k, v := range eclaims {
			claims.MapClaims[k] = v
		}

		// if root access is disabled, disable all its service accounts and temporary credentials.

	DefaultSecretKey = "minioadmin"
)

// Default access credentials
var (
	DefaultCredentials = Credentials{
		AccessKey: DefaultAccessKey,
		SecretKey: DefaultSecretKey,
	}
)

// claim key found in credentials which are service accounts
const iamPolicyClaimNameSA = "sa-policy"

const (
	// AccountOn indicates that credentials are enabled
	AccountOn = "on"