* assert that the tree connect path uses the netbios hostname.
                         */
                        tcax.setPath("\\\\" + this.netbiosName + "\\IPC$");
                    }
                }

                request.setSessionId(this.sessionId);
                request.setUid(this.uid);

            mavenConf = fileSystem.getPath(systemProperties.getProperty(MAVEN_INSTALLATION_CONF));
        } else if (systemProperties.getProperty("maven.conf") != null) {
            mavenConf = fileSystem.getPath(systemProperties.getProperty("maven.conf"));
        } else if (systemProperties.getProperty(MAVEN_HOME) != null) {
            mavenConf = fileSystem.getPath(systemProperties.getProperty(MAVEN_HOME), "conf");

 *
 * ```java
 * String attack = "http://example.com/static/images/../../../../../etc/passwd";
 * System.out.println(new URL(attack).getPath());
 * System.out.println(new URI(attack).getPath());
 * System.out.println(HttpUrl.parse(attack).encodedPath());
 * ```
 *
 * By canonicalizing the input paths, they are complicit in directory traversal attacks. Code that

    @Test
    public void test_buildFilePath_questionMarkInPath() {
        final Path result = indexExportJob.buildFilePath("/export", "https://example.com/page?query=1", new HtmlIndexExportFormatter());
        // URI.getPath() returns /page for this URL (query is separate)
        assertEquals(Path.of("/export/example.com/page.html"), result);
    }

    @Test
    public void test_buildFilePath_longPathComponent() {

            final URL childUrl = new URL(url, urlValue.startsWith(":") ? url.getProtocol() + urlValue : urlValue);
            String childUrlStr = childUrl.toExternalForm();
            final String path = childUrl.getPath();
            if (path != null && path.startsWith("/../")) {
                String normalizedPath = path;
                while (normalizedPath.startsWith("/../")) {

        SmbFile file = new SmbFile(baseUrl + "shared/path/file.txt", context);

        assertEquals("file.txt", file.getName(), "Name should be extracted correctly");
        assertTrue(file.getPath().endsWith("/shared/path/file.txt"), "Path should end correctly");
        assertEquals("shared", file.getShare(), "Share should be extracted correctly");
        assertNotNull(file.getParent(), "Parent should not be null");

        case NtStatus.NT_STATUS_PATH_NOT_COVERED:
            // samba fails to report the proper status for some operations
        case 0xC00000A2: // NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED
            checkReferral(resp, req.getPath(), req);
        case NtStatus.NT_STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW:
            break; /* normal for DCERPC named pipes */
        case NtStatus.NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED:
            break; /* normal for NTLMSSP */