}

	// 3.2 check that user cannot delete the bucket
	err = uClient.RemoveBucket(ctx, bucket)
	if err == nil || err.Error() != "Access Denied." {
		c.Fatalf("User was able to escalate privileges (Err=%v)!", err)
	}
}

func (s *TestSuiteIAM) TestAddServiceAccountPerms(c *check) {
	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), testDefaultTimeout)
	defer cancel()

	// 1. Create a policy

		if parentInClaim != parentUser {
			return false
		}
	} else {
		// This is needed so a malicious user cannot
		// use a leaked session key of another user
		// to widen its privileges.
		return false
	}

	isOwnerDerived := parentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey

	var err error
	var svcPolicies []string
	roleArn := args.GetRoleArn()

	switch {

  * Stop 'kubectl drain' deleting pods with local storage.
  * Add `kubectl rollout status`
* Security/Auth
  * L7 LB controller and disk attach controllers run on master, so nodes do not need those privileges.
  * Setting TLS1.2 minimum
  * `kubectl create secret tls` command
  * Webhook Token Authenticator
  * **beta** PodSecurityPolicy objects limits use of security-sensitive features by pods.
* Kubectl

	// 31.16.6: Whole Vector Register Move
	VMV1RV		V2, V1				// d730209e
	VMV2RV		V12, V10			// 57b5c09e
	VMV4RV		V8, V4				// 57b2819e
	VMV8RV		V8, V0				// 57b0839e

	//
	// Privileged ISA
	//

	// 3.3.1: Environment Call and Breakpoint
	ECALL						// 73000000
	SCALL						// 73000000
	EBREAK						// 73001000
	SBREAK						// 73001000