* @param accessResultData the access result data containing serialized data
     * @return the deserialized object
     */
    @Override
    public Object getData(final AccessResultData<?> accessResultData) {
        final byte[] data = accessResultData.getData();
        if (data != null) {
            try {
                return dataSerializer.fromBinaryToObject(data);
            } catch (final Exception e) {

                    if (dfos.isInMemory()) {
                        responseData.setResponseBody(dfos.getData());
                        contentLength = dfos.getData().length;
                        if (contentType == null) {
                            try (InputStream is = new ByteArrayInputStream(dfos.getData())) {
                                contentType = mimeTypeHelper.getContentType(is, url);

                    if (dfos.isInMemory()) {
                        responseData.setResponseBody(dfos.getData());
                        contentLength = dfos.getData().length;
                        if (contentType == null) {
                            try (InputStream is = new ByteArrayInputStream(dfos.getData())) {
                                contentType = mimeTypeHelper.getContentType(is, url);

            mavenConf = fileSystem.getPath(systemProperties.getProperty(MAVEN_INSTALLATION_CONF));
        } else if (systemProperties.getProperty("maven.conf") != null) {
            mavenConf = fileSystem.getPath(systemProperties.getProperty("maven.conf"));
        } else if (systemProperties.getProperty(MAVEN_HOME) != null) {
            mavenConf = fileSystem.getPath(systemProperties.getProperty(MAVEN_HOME), "conf");

                    readn(this.in, buffer, 4 + off, pad);
                }

                if (r.getDataLength() > 0) {
                    readn(this.in, r.getData(), r.getOffset(), r.getDataLength()); /* read direct */
                }
            } else {
                readn(this.in, buffer, 4 + SMB1_HEADER_LENGTH, size - SMB1_HEADER_LENGTH);

 *
 * ```java
 * String attack = "http://example.com/static/images/../../../../../etc/passwd";
 * System.out.println(new URL(attack).getPath());
 * System.out.println(new URI(attack).getPath());
 * System.out.println(HttpUrl.parse(attack).encodedPath());
 * ```
 *
 * By canonicalizing the input paths, they are complicit in directory traversal attacks. Code that

  }

  @Test
  fun headers() {
    var headers: Headers = headersOf("", "")
    headers = mapOf("" to "").toHeaders()
    val get: String? = headers[""]
    val date: Date? = headers.getDate("")
    val instant: Instant? = headers.getInstant("")
    val size: Int = headers.size
    val name: String = headers.name(0)
    val value: String = headers.value(0)
    val names: Set<String> = headers.names()

    @Test
    public void test_buildFilePath_questionMarkInPath() {
        final Path result = indexExportJob.buildFilePath("/export", "https://example.com/page?query=1", new HtmlIndexExportFormatter());
        // URI.getPath() returns /page for this URL (query is separate)
        assertEquals(Path.of("/export/example.com/page.html"), result);
    }

    @Test
    public void test_buildFilePath_longPathComponent() {

                    return chainedResponse;
                }

                if (request instanceof SmbComTreeConnectAndX tcax) {
                    if (this.netbiosName != null && tcax.getPath().endsWith("\\IPC$")) {
                        /*
                         * Some pipes may require that the hostname in the tree connect
                         * be the netbios name. So if we have the netbios server name

        SmbFile file = new SmbFile(baseUrl + "shared/path/file.txt", context);

        assertEquals("file.txt", file.getName(), "Name should be extracted correctly");
        assertTrue(file.getPath().endsWith("/shared/path/file.txt"), "Path should end correctly");
        assertEquals("shared", file.getShare(), "Share should be extracted correctly");
        assertNotNull(file.getParent(), "Parent should not be null");