if parentInClaim != parentUser {
			return false
		}
	} else {
		// This is needed so a malicious user cannot
		// use a leaked session key of another user
		// to widen its privileges.
		return false
	}

	isOwnerDerived := parentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey

	var err error
	var svcPolicies []string
	roleArn := args.GetRoleArn()

	switch {

# And probes tuned to startup faster
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
  labels:
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: privileged
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: privileged
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: privileged
  name: metallb-system
---
apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1
kind: CustomResourceDefinition
metadata:
  annotations: