*   The admission webhook configurations API, part of the admissionregistration API, is now at v1beta1. Delete any existing webhook configurations before you upgrade, and update your configuration files...

## Other notable changes

### API Machinery

- Added port configuration to Admission webhook configuration service reference.
- Added port configuration to AuditSink webhook configuration service reference.
- Added port configuration to CRD Conversion webhook configuration service reference.

* The webhook admission plugin now works even if the API server and the nodes are in two separate networks,for example, in GKE.
The webhook admission plugin now lets the webhook author use the DNS name of the service as the CommonName when generating the server cert for the webhook.
Action required:

- Kube-apiserver can now specify `--authentication-token-webhook-version=v1` or `--authorization-webhook-version=v1` to use `v1` TokenReview and SubjectAccessReview API objects when communicating with authentication and authorization webhooks. ([#84768](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/84768), [@liggitt](https://github.com/liggitt))

#tokenreview-v1-authentication-k8s-io) for the new tokens for improved scoping. Under audit logging, the new alpha-level "dynamic audit configuration" adds support for [dynamically registering webhooks to receive a stream of audit events](https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-cluster/audit/#webhook-backend). Finally, we've enhanced secrets protection by graduating [etcd encryption](https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/encrypt-data/) out of experimental.

### SIG...

### CVE-2021-25735: Validating Admission Webhook does not observe some previous fields

A security issue was discovered in kube-apiserver that could allow node
updates to bypass a Validating Admission Webhook. You are only affected
by this vulnerability if you run a Validating Admission Webhook for Nodes
that denies admission based at least partially on the old state of the
Node object.

* Audit events now log the existence and patch of mutating webhooks.  ([#77824](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/77824), [@roycaihw](https://github.com/roycaihw))
        * At Metadata audit level or higher, an annotation with key "mutation.webhook.admission.k8s.io/round_{round idx}_index_{order idx}" gets logged with JSON payload indicating a webhook gets invoked for given request and whether it mutated the object or not.

- Error messages returned in authentication webhook status responses are now correctly included in the apiserver log ([#73595](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/73595), [@liggitt](https://github.com/liggitt))

- Added support for CEL expressions to `v1alpha1 AuthorizationConfiguration` webhook `matchConditions`. ([#121223](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/121223), [@ritazh](https://github.com/ritazh))

possibility of dry-run requests overwhelming admission webhooks that rely on side effects and a reconciliation mechanism, a new field is being added to `admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1beta1.ValidatingWebhookConfiguration` and `admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1beta1.MutatingWebhookConfiguration` so that webhooks can explicitly register as having dry-run support. If a dry-run request is made on a resource that triggers a non dry-run supporting webhook, the request will be completely rejected, with "400:...