case ir.OSLICE2ARRPTR:
		// if arrlen > slice.len {
		//   panic(...)
		// }
		// slice.ptr
		n := n.(*ir.ConvExpr)
		v := s.expr(n.X)
		nelem := n.Type().Elem().NumElem()
		arrlen := s.constInt(types.Types[types.TINT], nelem)
		cap := s.newValue1(ssa.OpSliceLen, types.Types[types.TINT], v)
		s.boundsCheck(arrlen, cap, ssa.BoundsConvert, false)
		op := ssa.OpSlicePtr

There is no mitigation from this issue.  Cluster admins should take care to secure aggregated API servers and should not grant access to mutate `APIService`s to untrusted parties.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kube-apiserver v1.25.0
  - kube-apiserver v1.24.0 - v1.24.4

			// (Section 5.4.1) of type INADEQUATE_SECURITY if one of
			// the prohibited cipher suites are negotiated."
			//
			// We choose that. In my opinion, the spec is weak
			// here. It also says both parties must support at least
			// TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 so there's no
			// excuses here. If we really must, we could allow an
			// "AllowInsecureWeakCiphers" option on the server later.