* Composite bodies' IDs are now based on path, not only on route name, as the auto-generated name uses the function names, that can be duplicated in different modules.
    * The same new ID generation applies to response models.
    * This also changes the generated title for those models.

	root http2priorityNode

	// nodes maps stream ids to priority tree nodes.
	nodes map[uint32]*http2priorityNode

	// maxID is the maximum stream id in nodes.
	maxID uint32

	// lists of nodes that have been closed or are idle, but are kept in
	// the tree for improved prioritization. When the lengths exceed either
	// maxClosedNodesInTree or maxIdleNodesInTree, old nodes are discarded.

    - [CVE-2023-3955: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3955-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
    - [CVE-2023-3676: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3676-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
  - [Changes by Kind](#changes-by-kind-10)

- [`KT-65404`](https://youtrack.jetbrains.com/issue/KT-65404) KAPT should print a warning if stub generation is triggered for an interface with method bodies but without -Xjvm-default=all or -Xjvm-default=all-compatibility

    - [CVE-2023-3955: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3955-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
    - [CVE-2023-3676: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3676-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
  - [Changes by Kind](#changes-by-kind-2)

    - [CVE-2023-3955: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3955-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
    - [CVE-2023-3676: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3676-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
  - [Changes by Kind](#changes-by-kind-7)

  // NodeTaintsPolicy indicates how we will treat node taints when calculating
  // pod topology spread skew. Options are:
  // - Honor: nodes without taints, along with tainted nodes for which the incoming pod
  // has a toleration, are included.
  // - Ignore: node taints are ignored. All nodes are included.
  //
  // If this value is nil, the behavior is equivalent to the Ignore policy.

	out.HostIP = in.HostIP
	out.HostIPs = *(*[]core.HostIP)(unsafe.Pointer(&in.HostIPs))
	// WARNING: in.PodIP requires manual conversion: does not exist in peer-type
	out.PodIPs = *(*[]core.PodIP)(unsafe.Pointer(&in.PodIPs))
	out.StartTime = (*metav1.Time)(unsafe.Pointer(in.StartTime))
	out.InitContainerStatuses = *(*[]core.ContainerStatus)(unsafe.Pointer(&in.InitContainerStatuses))

        getElementTypeOrSelf(offset.getType()), input_shape[axis]));
    offset = b.create<RemOp>(
        b.create<AddOp>(b.create<RemOp>(offset, axis_size), axis_size),
        axis_size);

    // Stack two copies of the dimension, then slice from the calculated
    // offset. This also works if shift is not constant.
    // DynamicSliceOp requires the sizes being integer, and we can get the
    // information from input shape.

</li>
<li>
	Both type parameters have a known type argument
	and the type arguments unify per the given matching modes.
</li>
</ul>

<p>
A single bound type parameter <code>P</code> and another type <code>T</code> unify
per the given matching modes if:
</p>

<ul>
<li>
	<code>P</code> doesn't have a known type argument.