granting the caller `nodes/proxy` permission in RBAC but that also grants the caller permissions to exec, run and attach to containers on the nodes and doing so does not follow the least privilege principle. Granting callers more permissions than they need can give attackers an opportunity to escalate privileges. ([#126347](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/126347), [@vinayakankugoyal](https://github.com/vinayakankugoyal)) [SIG API Machinery, Auth, Cluster Lifecycle and Node]

###...

        </field>
      </fields>
    </class>
    <class>
      <name>Contributor</name>
      <description>Description of a person who has contributed to the project, but who does not have
        commit privileges. Usually, these contributions come in the form of patches submitted.</description>
      <version>3.0.0+</version>
      <fields>
        <field>
          <name>name</name>
          <version>3.0.0+</version>

### Other notable changes

* rkt: Improve support for privileged pod (pod whose all containers are privileged)  ([#31286](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/31286), [@yifan-gu](https://github.com/yifan-gu))

2. Review and delete any PodSecurityPolicy objects you do not want all pod-creating users to be able to use (NOTE: Privileged users that were making use of those policies will also lose access to those policies). For example:
  * `kubectl delete podsecuritypolicies/my-privileged-policy`
3. After upgrading to 1.5.5, re-create the exported PodSecurityPolicy objects:
  * `kubectl create -f psp.yaml`

## Downloads for v1.5.5