}

		if isSourceEncrypted {
			// Remove all source encrypted related metadata to
			// avoid copying them in target object.
			crypto.RemoveInternalEntries(srcInfo.UserDefined)
		}

		// do not try to verify encrypted content
		srcInfo.Reader, err = hash.NewReader(ctx, reader, targetSize, "", "", actualSize)
		if err != nil {
			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
			return
		}

	if success {
		return
	}
	hip.clientToken = token
	// if request was not successful, try this server locally if token
	// is not found the call will fail anyways. if token is empty
	// try this server to generate a new token.

	type healResp struct {
		respBytes []byte
		apiErr    APIError
		errBody   string
	}

    """Extract endpoint context with caching to avoid repeated file I/O."""
    func_id = id(func)

    if func_id in _endpoint_context_cache:
        return _endpoint_context_cache[func_id]

    try:
        ctx: EndpointContext = {}

        if (source_file := inspect.getsourcefile(func)) is not None:
            ctx["file"] = source_file
        if (line_number := inspect.getsourcelines(func)[1]) is not None:

	}
	if len(buckets) != 2 || buckets[0].Name != "bucket1" || buckets[1].Name != "bucket2" {
		c.Fatalf("restricted STS account should only have access to bucket1 and bucket2")
	}

	// Try to escalate privileges
	restrictedAdmClient := s.getAdminClient(c, value.AccessKeyID, value.SecretAccessKey, value.SessionToken)
	_, err = restrictedAdmClient.AddServiceAccount(ctx, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{

	}
	for {
		select {
		case <-mTimer.C:
			saveMRFToDisk()
			mTimer.Reset(mrfSaveInterval)
		case <-p.ctx.Done():
			p.mrfStopCh <- struct{}{}
			xioutil.SafeClose(p.mrfSaveCh)
			// We try to save if possible, but we don't care beyond that.
			saveMRFToDisk()
			return
		case e, ok := <-p.mrfSaveCh:
			if !ok {
				return
			}
			entries[e.versionID] = e