issues with Docker 1.9.1 can be found below.
  * CPU hardcapping will be enabled by default for containers with CPU limit set,
if supported by the kernel. You should either adjust your CPU limit, or set CPU
request only, if you want to avoid hardcapping. If the kernel does not support
CPU Quota, NodeStatus will contain a warning indicating that CPU Limits cannot
be enforced.

 * or network should be done asynchronously.
 */
abstract class EventListener {
  /**
   * Invoked as soon as a call is enqueued or executed by a client. In case of thread or stream
   * limits, this call may be executed well before processing the request is able to begin.
   *
   * This will be invoked only once for a single [Call]. Retries of different routes or redirects

 * This callback processes file events (create, modify, delete) and manages document indexing and deletion
 * operations in the search engine. It supports recursive crawling with configurable depth and access count limits.
 *
 * <p>The implementation uses an executor service for concurrent processing of file operations and maintains
 * a cache of URLs to be deleted for batch processing. It handles redirect following and child URL discovery

 * handles timeout scenarios, and ensures proper cleanup of resources.</p>
 *
 * <p>Key features:</p>
 * <ul>
 *   <li>Concurrent crawler process management with configurable limits</li>
 *   <li>Selective crawling based on configuration IDs</li>
 *   <li>Document expiration handling</li>
 *   <li>Hot thread monitoring for performance analysis</li>
 *   <li>Process isolation with separate JVM</li>

    idle and active connections for everything. OkHttp now detects and warns on
    connections that were allocated but never released, and will enforce HTTP/2
    stream limits. This update also fixes `Call.cancel()` to not do I/O on the
    calling thread.
 *  Fix: Don't log gzipped data in the logging interceptor.
 *  Fix: Don't resolve DNS addresses when connecting through a SOCKS proxy.

         *
         * Ideally we'd have a real eviction policy, but until we see a problem in practice, I hope
         * that this will suffice. I have not even benchmarked with different size limits.
         */
        if (validClasses.size() > 1000) {
          validClasses.clear();
        }

        validClasses.add(new WeakReference<Class<? extends Exception>>(exceptionClass));
      }
    }

 * response body. Each response body is supported by an active connection to the webserver. This
 * imposes both obligations and limits on the client application.
 *
 * ### The response body must be closed.
 *
 * Each response body is backed by a limited resource like a socket (live network responses) or
 * an open file (for cached responses). Failing to close the response body will leak resources and

        br.addElement("Against for CVE-2014-0050 (JVN14876762).");
        br.addElement("Boundary size is limited by Framework.");
        br.addElement("Too long boundary is treated as 404 because it's thought of as attack.");
        br.addElement("");
        br.addElement("While, you can override the boundary limit size");
        br.addElement(" in " + getClass().getSimpleName() + ".");
        br.addItem("Content Type");

         *
         * Ideally we'd have a real eviction policy, but until we see a problem in practice, I hope
         * that this will suffice. I have not even benchmarked with different size limits.
         */
        if (validClasses.size() > 1000) {
          validClasses.clear();
        }

        validClasses.add(new WeakReference<Class<? extends Exception>>(exceptionClass));
      }
    }

Use [CertificatePinner](https://square.github.io/okhttp/4.x/okhttp/okhttp3/-certificate-pinner/) to restrict which certificates and certificate authorities are trusted. Certificate pinning increases security, but limits your server team’s abilities to update their TLS certificates. **Do not use certificate pinning without the blessing of your server’s TLS administrator!**

=== ":material-language-kotlin: Kotlin"
    ```kotlin