* Since Quantiles provides a fluent-style API, each test covers a chain of methods resulting in
   * the computation of one or more quantiles (or in an error) rather than individual methods. The
   * tests are divided into three sections:
   * 1. Tests on a hardcoded dataset for chains starting with median(), quartiles(), and scale(10);
   * 2. Tests on hardcoded datasets include non-finite values for chains starting with scale(10);

	})

	fmt.Fprintln(w, "LISTENER\tCHAIN\tMATCH\tDESTINATION")
	for _, l := range listeners {
		chains := getFilterChains(l)
		lname := "envoy://" + l.GetName()
		// Avoid duplicating the listener and filter name
		if l.GetInternalListener() != nil && len(chains) == 1 && chains[0].GetName() == lname {
			lname = "internal"
		}
		for _, fc := range chains {

			name := fc.GetName()

	iptablesBuilder := builder.NewIptablesRuleBuilder(ipbuildConfig(cfg.cfg))

	// Insert jumps to our custom chains
	// This is mostly just for visual tidiness and cleanup, as we can delete the secondary chains and jumps
	// without polluting the main table too much.

	// -t mangle -A PREROUTING -j ISTIO_PRERT
	iptablesBuilder.AppendRule(

    assertFailsToDecode(base64(), "Wf2!", "Unrecognized character: !");
    // This sentence just isn't base64() encoded.
    assertFailsToDecode(base64(), "let's not talk of love or chains!");
    // A 4n+1 length string is never legal base64().
    assertFailsToDecode(base64(), "12345", "Invalid input length 5");
    // These have a combination of invalid length, unrecognized characters and wrong padding.

      }
    }
  }

  /**
   * Not checking the CA bit created a vulnerability in old OkHttp releases. It is exploited by
   * triggering different chains to be discovered by the TLS engine and our chain cleaner. In this
   * attack there's several different chains.
   *
   *
   * The victim's gets a non-CA certificate signed by a CA, and pins the CA root and/or
   * intermediate. This is business as usual.
   *

            }
            descriptor.language === Language.CPP -> {
                "* An installed {cpp} compiler. See which link:{userManualPath}/building_cpp_projects.html#sec:cpp_supported_tool_chain[{cpp} tool chains] are supported by Gradle."
            }
            else -> {
                ""

    assertFailsToDecode(base64(), "Wf2!", "Unrecognized character: !");
    // This sentence just isn't base64() encoded.
    assertFailsToDecode(base64(), "let's not talk of love or chains!");
    // A 4n+1 length string is never legal base64().
    assertFailsToDecode(base64(), "12345", "Invalid input length 5");
    // These have a combination of invalid length, unrecognized characters and wrong padding.

            len += pad8(bufferIndex);
        }
        else if ( compound && this.nextCommand == 0 && this.readSize > 0 ) {
            // TODO: only apply this for actual compound chains, or is this correct for single responses, too?
            // 3.2.5.1.9 Handling Compounded Responses
            // The final response in the compounded response chain will have NextCommand equal to 0,

import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeoutException;
import org.checkerframework.checker.nullness.qual.Nullable;

/**
 * A {@link ListenableFuture} that supports fluent chains of operations. For example:
 *
 * <pre>{@code
 * ListenableFuture<Boolean> adminIsLoggedIn =
 *     FluentFuture.from(usersDatabase.getAdminUser())
 *         .transform(User::getId, directExecutor())

OkHttp 2.x Change Log
=====================

## Version 2.7.5

_2016-02-25_

 *  Fix: Change the certificate pinner to always build full chains. This
    prevents a potential crash when using certificate pinning with the Google
    Play Services security provider.


## Version 2.7.4

_2016-02-07_

 *  Fix: Don't crash when finding the trust manager if the Play Services (GMS)
    security provider is installed.