if expectedHost != extractedHost {
		t.Errorf("host header mismatch: expected `%s`, got `%s`", expectedHost, extractedHost)
	}
	// assert the result with the expected value.
	if expectedContentSha256 != extractedContentSha256 {
		t.Errorf("x-amz-content-sha256 header mismatch: expected `%s`, got `%s`", expectedContentSha256, extractedContentSha256)
	}
	if expectedTime != extractedDate {

									fmt.Println("SIZE MISMATCH", len(calculated), len(inFile))
								} else if len(calculated) > 10 {
									calculated = calculated[:10]
									inFile = inFile[:10]
									extra = "..."
								}
								a := hex.EncodeToString(calculated) + extra
								b := hex.EncodeToString(inFile) + extra

			t.Errorf("Md5 Mismatch")
		}
	}

	for key, value := range objects {
		var byteBuffer bytes.Buffer
		err = GetObject(context.Background(), obj, "bucket", key, 0, int64(len(value)), &byteBuffer, "", opts)
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("%s: <ERROR> %s", instanceType, err)
		}
		if !bytes.Equal(byteBuffer.Bytes(), value) {

		t.Fatalf("deserialize LastUpdate mismatch\nwant: %+v\ngot:  %+v", want, got)
	}
	if len(want.Cache) != len(got.Cache) {
		t.Errorf("deserialize mismatch length\nwant: %+v\ngot:  %+v", len(want.Cache), len(got.Cache))
	}
	for wkey, wval := range want.Cache {
		gotv := got.Cache[wkey]
		if !equalAsJSON(gotv, wval) {
			t.Errorf("deserialize mismatch, key %v\nwant: %#v\ngot:  %#v", wkey, wval, gotv)
		}
	}

            }
            byte[] expected = calculateMIC(data);
            if (mic.length != expected.length || mic[0] != expected[0]) {
                throw new CIFSException("MIC mismatch");
            }
        }

        @Override
        public boolean isMICAvailable() {
            // Available if context is established and integrity is supported

		},
		{
			name:         "modtime, signature mismatch",
			m:            metaCacheEntries{inputSerialized[0], inputSerialized[0], inputSerialized[0], inputSerialized[1]},
			r:            metadataResolutionParams{dirQuorum: 4, objQuorum: 4, strict: false},
			wantSelected: &inputSerialized[0],
			wantOk:       true,
		},
		{
			name:         "modtime,signature mismatch, strict",

<LocationConstraint xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"></LocationConstraint>`),
			errorResponse: APIErrorResponse{},
			shouldPass:    true,
		},
		// Test case - 2.
		// Tests for signature mismatch error.
		{
			bucketName:         bucketName,
			accessKey:          "abcd",
			secretKey:          "abcd",
			expectedRespStatus: http.StatusForbidden,
			locationResponse:   []byte(""),

        when(readResponse.getOffset()).thenReturn(0);

        boolean result = digest.verify(data, 0, data.length, 0, readResponse);
        assertTrue(result); // Signature mismatch expected
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Test verify method with invalid signature")
    void testVerifyWithInvalidSignature() {
        SMB1SigningDigest digest = new SMB1SigningDigest(testMacSigningKey);

        // Compare actual bytes (up to encoded length)
        for (int i = 0; i < encoded1; i++) {
            assertEquals(buffer1[i], buffer2[i], "Mismatch at position " + i);
            assertEquals(buffer2[i], buffer3[i], "Mismatch at position " + i);
        }
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Test with typical Windows pipe name format")
    void testWithTypicalWindowsPipeName() {

    assertLockHeld()

    val routeUrl = route.address.url

    if (url.port != routeUrl.port) {
      return false // Port mismatch.
    }

    if (url.host == routeUrl.host) {
      return true // Host match. The URL is supported.
    }

    // We have a host mismatch. But if the certificate matches, we're still good.
    return !noCoalescedConnections && handshake != null && certificateSupportHost(url, handshake)