<postConstruct name="addCondition">
			<arg>"mimetype"</arg>
			<arg>"image/bmp"
			</arg>
		</postConstruct>
		<postConstruct name="addCondition">
			<arg>"mimetype"</arg>
			<arg>"image/x-windows-bmp"
			</arg>
		</postConstruct>
		<postConstruct name="addCondition">
			<arg>"mimetype"</arg>
			<arg>"image/x-ms-bmp"
			</arg>
		</postConstruct>
		<postConstruct name="addCondition">

    "image/gif")  format_hint="gif:" ;;
    "image/tiff") format_hint="tiff:" ;;
    "image/png")  format_hint="png:" ;;
    "image/jpeg") format_hint="jpeg:" ;;
    "image/bmp"|"image/x-windows-bmp"|"image/x-ms-bmp") format_hint="bmp:" ;;
    "image/vnd.adobe.photoshop"|"image/photoshop"|"application/x-photoshop"|"application/photoshop") format_hint="psd:" ;;
  esac

          // Mostly 2-byte UTF-8 sequences - "European" text
          return 0x800;
        } else if (userFriendly.matches("(?i)(?:Chinese|Han|Asian|BMP)")) {
          // Mostly 3-byte UTF-8 sequences - "Asian" text
          return Character.MIN_SUPPLEMENTARY_CODE_POINT;
        } else if (userFriendly.matches("(?i)(?:Cuneiform|rare|exotic|supplementary.*)")) {

have different security properties and provide different levels of confidence
when dealing with untrusted data. Based on the security history of these
libraries we consider that it is safe to work with untrusted inputs for PNG,
BMP, GIF, WAV, RAW, RAW\_PADDED, CSV and PROTO formats. All other input formats,
including tensorflow-io should be sandboxed if used to process untrusted data.

For example, if an attacker were to upload a malicious video file, they could