contains the following information:

- The project / component that contains the reported vulnerability.
- A description of the vulnerability. In particular, the type of the
   reported vulnerability and how it might be exploited. Alternatively,
   a well-established vulnerability identifier, e.g. CVE number, can be
   used instead.

Based on the description mentioned above, a MinIO engineer or security team
member investigates:

///

The `status_code` parameter receives a number with the HTTP status code.

/// info

`status_code` can alternatively also receive an `IntEnum`, such as Python's <a href="https://docs.python.org/3/library/http.html#http.HTTPStatus" class="external-link" target="_blank">`http.HTTPStatus`</a>.

///

It will:

                + "      mvn install:install-file -DgroupId=aGroupId -DartifactId=anArtifactId -Dversion=aVersion "
                + "-Dclassifier=aClassifier -Dpackaging=jar -Dfile=/path/to/file" + LS + LS
                + "  Alternatively, if you host your own repository you can deploy the file there: " + LS
                + "      mvn deploy:deploy-file -DgroupId=aGroupId -DartifactId=anArtifactId"

```sh
openssl ecparam -genkey -name prime256v1 | openssl ec -out private.key
```

A response similar to this one should be displayed:

```
read EC key
writing EC key
```

Alternatively, use the following command to generate a private ECDSA key protected by a password:

```sh
openssl ecparam -genkey -name prime256v1 | openssl ec -aes256 -out private.key -passout pass:PASSWORD
```

your setup can use this feature combination safely.

To enable compression+encryption use:

```bash
~ mc admin config set myminio compression allow_encryption=on
```

Or alternatively through the environment variable `MINIO_COMPRESSION_ALLOW_ENCRYPTION=on`.

### 4. Excluded Types

- Already compressed objects are not fit for compression since they do not have compressible patterns.

    // in the opposite order from how they were added so we need to reverse the list to fulfill our
    // contract.
    // This is somewhat annoying, but turns out to be very fast in practice. Alternatively, we could
    // drop the contract on the method that enforces this queue like behavior since depending on it
    // is likely to be a bug anyway.

Notably, this prevents us from sending a GOAWAY to notify peers we have shutdown.

As a result, while we meet our two must-haves (send and accept traffic throughout the entire pod lifetime), we do not have an optimal solution here yet.
Alternatively, we could send the GOAWAY prior to the pod termination (assuming this allows existing and new connections to function still).

## Ztunnel Shutdown/Upgrade/Restart