verbs: ["watch", "get", "list"]
{{- if .Values.cni.repair.repairPods }}
{{- /*  No privileges needed*/}}
{{- else if .Values.cni.repair.deletePods }}
  - apiGroups: [""]
    resources: ["pods"]
    verbs: ["delete"]
{{- else if .Values.cni.repair.labelPods }}
  - apiGroups: [""]
    {{- /* pods/status is less privileged than the full pod, and either can label. So use the lower pods/status */}}
    resources: ["pods/status"]

                    "responses": {
                        "404": {"description": "Item not found"},
                        "302": {"description": "The item was moved"},
                        "403": {"description": "Not enough privileges"},
                        "200": {
                            "description": "Successful Response",
                            "content": {
                                "image/png": {},

	Remove(ctx context.Context, object string, rv remoteVersionID) error
	InUse(ctx context.Context) (bool, error)
}

const probeObject = "probeobject"

// checkWarmBackend checks if tier config credentials have sufficient privileges
// to perform all operations defined in the WarmBackend interface.
func checkWarmBackend(ctx context.Context, w WarmBackend) error {
	remoteVersionID, err := w.Put(ctx, probeObject, strings.NewReader("MinIO"), 5)

    inject.istio.io/templates: "gateway"
    sidecar.istio.io/inject: "true"

  # Define the security context for the pod.
  # If unset, this will be automatically set to the minimum privileges required to bind to port 80 and 443.
  # On Kubernetes 1.22+, this only requires the `net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start` sysctl.
  securityContext: ~
  containerSecurityContext: ~

  service:

              port: 8000
          securityContext:
            privileged: true # always requires privilege to be useful (install node plugin, etc)
            runAsGroup: 0
            runAsUser: 0
            runAsNonRoot: false
            # Both ambient and sidecar repair mode require elevated node privileges to function.
            # But we don't need _everything_ in `privileged`, so drop+readd capabilities based on feature.

Date:   Sat Jun 15 11:27:17 2019 -0700

    [security] Match ${aws:username} exactly instead of prefix match (#7791)

    This PR fixes a security issue where an IAM user based
    on his policy is granted more privileges than restricted
    by the users IAM policy.

    This is due to an issue of prefix based Matcher() function
    which was incorrectly matching prefix based on resource
    prefixes instead of exact match.
```

from anywhere, and executes the graphs it is sent without performing any checks.
Therefore, if you run a `tf.train.Server` in your network, anybody with access
to the network can execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user
running the `tf.train.Server`.

## Untrusted inputs during training and prediction

TensorFlow supports a wide range of input data formats. For example it can

This client could be a browser with a frontend, a code from someone else, an IoT device, etc.

You could need to tell the client that:

* The client doesn't have enough privileges for that operation.
* The client doesn't have access to that resource.
* The item the client was trying to access doesn't exist.
* etc.

      # Note the pod will be crashlooping, so this may take a few minutes to become fully functional based on when the retry occurs.
      # This requires no RBAC privilege, but does require `securityContext.privileged/CAP_SYS_ADMIN`.
      repairPods: true

      initContainerName: "istio-validation"

      brokenPodLabelKey: "cni.istio.io/uninitialized"
      brokenPodLabelValue: "true"

		Patch(
			context.Background(),
			pod.Name,
			types.MergePatchType,
			annotationPatch,
			metav1.PatchOptions{},
			// Both "pods" and "pods/status" can mutate the metadata. However, pods/status is lower privilege, so we use that instead.
			"status",
		)
	return err
}

func AnnotateUnenrollPod(client kubernetes.Interface, pod *metav1.ObjectMeta) error {